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CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Appellant, v.
HO SING et al., Respondents.
Streets-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Abutting
Owner.-An abutting landowner may be held liable for the
dangerous condition of portions of the public sidewalk which
have been altered or constructed for the benefit of his property and which serve a use independent of and apart from
the ordinary and accustomed use for which sidewalks are
designed.
[2] Id.-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Abutting Owner.
-The duty to maintain portions of a sidewalk which have
been altered for the benefit of abutting property runs with
the land, and a property owner cannot avoid liability on the
ground that the condition was created by or at the request
of his predecessors in title.
[3a, 3b] Id.-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Municipality.-A city has the duty to keep sidewalks in safe condition, it is directly liable to pedestrians for failing to correct
a dangerous condition of which it has notice, and it is notrelieved of responsibility in this regard merely because the
condition was created or maintained by an abutting property
owner who might also be liable to pedestrians for injuries resulting therefrom.
[4] Id.-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Municipality:
Liability of Abutting Owner.-With regard to persons who are
injured by the defective condition of a sidewalk, which condition was created or maintained by an abutting property
owner, the city and the landowner are joint or concurrent
tort feasors; each is directly liable for his own wrong and each
may be held liable for the entire damage suffered.
[5a, 5b] !d.-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Municipality.-Even if a city has the right to contribution or indemnity from an abutting landowner for damages recovered
from the city because of the defective condition of a sidewalk,
the city's liability to pedestrians would not be merely dependent or derivative from that of the landowner.
[1] Liability of abutting owner or occupant for condition of
part of private driveway which is within street, note, 59 A.L.R.
441. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Highways and Streets, § 224 et seq.;
Am.Jur., High:ways, § 364.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 7] Streets, § 74; [3, 5] Streets,
§ 71; [4) Streets, §§ 71, 74; [6] Contributions, § 8.

128

CrTY & Coee\TY ov R. F.

lil1 C.2d

[6] Contributions-Joint Tort Feasors,
trihution Jwtween
tort ft·a~ors ndmib or ,;(>Jl!E
nnd a ri"·ht of indPmnilientiou lllllY ari~e
a l'<'onlt of eontract i>l', equitable eonsidtTntions. and
not reol rided to
situations involviJig' a wholly vi(oarions linbility.
[7] Streets-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Abutting
Owner.-\\'here an adjoining property cnvuer for the exelusive
!Jpnefit of his own property plaees in a publie stret't or sidewalk some artificial structure and a city is eOillpellt•ll to payin limnagcs to a member of Uw puhlie injnrNl
thereby, the
has a right to retOVPl' the amount so paid
from the property owner
wny of ind<'mnif.v.

APPBAI, from a judgment oi' the Superior Court of the
City and County oi' San Francisco. ,John B. :Molinari, Judge,
Reversed.
Aetion by a munic:ipality to rPeover indemnity for the
amount it was eompe1led to pay a pedestrian for injuries rec-eived when she fdl over a defedive skylight in a sidewalk in
front of defendant's premise>i. ,J ndgmeni for dcfeudant
after sustaining demurrer to eomplaint witltont leave to
amend, reversed.
Dion R. Holm, City Attorney, and George E. Eaglin,
Deputy City Attorney, for Appellant.
Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon and Frank E. Farrella for
Hespondents.
CAR'rER, J.-'rhis is an appeal by the city and county of
San lj'rancis<:o, a munic-ipal eorporation, from a judgment
after defendants', Ho Sing and Ho Lum Shee, flemurrer to
its complaint had been sustained without leaye to amend.
Mr. and 1\Irs. IIo purehased a building in San Francis<:o.
Their preder:essors in ti1le had installed a sidewalk skylight
in front of the building. This skylight 11·as over a basement
whieh was maintailled by defendants lio. During the eourse
of defc•ndants' pos;;ession of the building, l lw sidewalk skylight developed a n~H:k two inelws wi(le and 18 iw·hes long.
On August 24, Hl52, one Mrs. \Vaguer tripywd he\'anse o£ ;;aid
craek and fell, breaki11g her hip. l\Ir. and MrC<. \Vagner sued
both the r:ity and eounty of San b'raneist·o and Mr. and
Mrs. Ho for damages resulting tlwrd't·om ( l.Y illf1tcr v. City
& Connty of San Francisco ct a/., No. 12356.'2) and recovered
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final
against plaintiff city and defendants Ho
a total amount of $15,000 plus interest and costs. Plaintiff
lVIrs. \Vaguer the sum of $5,000 plus $102.03 costs.
Defendants paid Mrs. \Vagner the sum of $10,000.
Plaintiff, in bringing this action, seeks to
defendant;;
to
it in the sum of $5,258.87 ($5,000 plu;; costs and
) . As heretofore noted, the trial court sustained
defendants' demurrer to plaintiff's complaint without leave
to amend.
The only question involved is one of first impression h1
this state and may be stated as follows: 'Where au adjoining
property owner for the exelusive benefit of his own property
places in a public street or sidewalk some artificial structure
and a city is compelled to pay compensation in damages to a
member of the public injured thereby may the city recover
the amount so paid from the property owner by way of
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indemnity~

This question was specifically left open in Peters v. City d';
County of San Francisco, 41 Cal.2d 419, 430 [260 P.2d 55],
where we said: "\Ve are not presented with the problem
whether the city might have a right over against the Duques
in the event it pays the judgment and the jury returns a
verdict against the property owners on a new trial, and
nothing we say here should be taken as indicating our views
on that matter.'' Both sides argue, however, that from certain
statements made in the Peters case, there is, or is not, a right
over against the property owner in the case at bar.
In the Peters case the plaintiff brought suit against both
the city and the Duques, as property owners, for damages
sustained by her from a fall oecasioncd by a ramp or slope
extending from a building maintained by the Dnques and
whieh extended across the sidewalk and caused a depression
therein. 'l'he jury found for the plaintiff against the city
but against the plaintiff with respect to the Duques' liability.
On appeal, we affirmed the judgment against the city and reversed that portion \vhich exon<>rated def<>ndant Duque from
liability.
[1] \Ve held that: ( 1) "The rule is that an abutting landowner may be held liable for the dangerous condition of
portions of the public sidewalk which have been altered or
constructed for the benefit of his property and whieh serve
a use independent of and apart from the ordinary and accustomed use for which sidewalks are designed"; [2] (2)
"The duty to maintain portions of a sidewalk whieh have
5! C.2d.-5
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thai the eondiiion 1\'ils J·n·aied

or

on
:11

ilH' n•qw·st of

hi,;
in title' : [3a]
1luty to ](('('fl :-;i1kwalks i!l sal'c eotHlil
li>1hle
io pedestrians for failing· to em·t·,•d a
eondition
of \\'hieh it had notiec, and it is not reliPved of it,;
bility in this r<:>gard nwrely 1WC'HUS<: ihe condition was t·r·Nttell
or maintained
a propert:; OWJWl' ·who
al~o he
liable to JH•destJ·ians for injnrie'l resulting therefrom"; all([
[4] ( 4) "!Yith reuard to persons who are
by such
a condih'on. the city and the l(l11rlowuer arc )oiill or cmtCII1'1'cnt
tort
each is dirC'ctly liable
his o1rn wronu and
mch may be held liable for the entire
(Emphasis added; Peters Y.
&
41 Cal.2d 41!!, 428, 427, 42~J [2GO P.2ll
eited.)
Prom the emphasized portion ( 4) set forth
ddt:ndants argue that sinc•e the ahuiting property owner and tbr'
city arc joint, or (~Oneurrent, tortfeasors, the long established
rule in this state against eonteibution brtween joint tortfeasors applies. The city, on the other hand, argues that this
is not a question of contribution but of indemnity. [5a] vVe
said in the Peters case that "Even if sueh a right to contribution or indemnity were recognized, ho\\·evrr, it would
not mean, as assrrted by the eity, that its liability io
pedestrians is merely dependrnt or derivative from that of
the landowner and not joint or clireet. [6] As noted above,
the rule against eontribution betwPcn joint tort feasors admits
of some exc-eptions, and a n'ght oJ
may arise
as a result of contmct or equitable considcraUons and is not
restricted to situations involYing a wholly viearions liability,
such as where a master has paid a judgrneut for damages
resulting from the Yoluntary ad of his sernwt." ( 41 Cal.2d
419, 480, 431.) The eity contends that when an abutting
landowner makes an mmsual usc of the public strePts for hi,;
owu private benefit it is with the permission, either express
or implied, of the munieipality; that sm·h permission carries
with it an implied condition that the landowner \Yill exercise
due care for the safety of the public- and 1hat it \Yill hold the
eity harmless for any damages oceasionrd by the laek of due
eare. In other words, indemnity, as distinguished from
contribution, exists because of some special relationship existing behveen the two tortfeasors and the entire loss is
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;;:hiftrd to the one bouml to indemnify. (Prosser on 'forts,
2d eel., § 46, p. 249.) In Rnnyon v. City of Los
40
889 [180 P. 837], it was hrld: "The abutting
ow11er, whose title extrnc1s to the f!enter of tlw
may
c>xeavate a yanlt or eellar under the sidewalk. Such owner,
with
of: tbe
authorities, rxprcss or impliedafter a rca:mna hlt;
no obhas been made
the proper offkials---may insert in
the sickwal k, for the purpose of admitting light and air to
the vanlt or
an iron grating, or othrr similar device,
if
alld properly constructed, and such contrivance in
the sidewalk is not a nuisallce per se. (Rider v. Clark, [132
Cal. 382
P. 564)] snpm; Morrison v. Avoy, 7 CaL
37
P. 6261; Hirsch v. James 8. Remick Co., 38
Cal.App. 764 [117 P. 876]; Fisher v. l'hiTkell, 21 Mich. 1
[ 4 .Am.Hep. 422] .) "

'THE CrrY's ARou:~mNT
It is the position of the city that in the absence of confliet
with the constitutional or statutory law of this state, the common law prevails (Civ. Code,§ 22.2; Cole v. Bush, 45 Cal.2d
845, 335
P.2d 460, 54 A.hR.2d 1187]) awl that the common law is eonsistent throughout the United States that indemnity is allowed in such a situation as we have here.
The eity cite::; numy eases from out-of-state courts in whieh
has been allmn'cl. 'l'he theories relied on by such
('ourts haYe differed as has lwen heretofore noted by us iu the
Pei ers ease. \Ve said there: ''The opinious in those eases,
however, recoguize that the city ha~ an independent duty
to coned dangerous conditions of which it has noticr, regardless of who created them, and the term 'seeondary' is not used
therein to indicate that the city is merely liable vicariously
for the lJPg]igencc of the landowner. Instead, it appears that
the terrn is used as a means of indicating that, in the jnrisdiction whe1·e the r:ase arose, a eity llas a right to be indemnified
by a landowner in the event it is compelled to pay damages
n'rmlting from a dangerous eondition he created or mnintainecl
ancl for whif~h he would be liable to pedestrians. In this regard
it may be noted that a mimlwr of jurisdictions whieh adhere
to the ricw tlwi the eity and the laudo1nwr are joint or eoncurrent tort fea,ors make an
to the general rule
('(mtrilmtiou bet wce11 joint
and lwl(l that
a nnmieipality has a right to be ilHlcmnified by the property
owner in such a situation. (Chicago v. Robbius, 67 U.S. 418,

132

CITY & CouNTY OF S. F. v. Ho SING

[51 C.2d

425 [17 L.Ed. 298, 302-303]; Washington Gaslight
Co. v. District
Columbia, 161 U.S. 316 [16 S.Ct. 564, 568,
40 hEd. 712]; Salt Lake City v. Schubach, 108 Utah 266
[159 P.2d 149, 157-158, 160 A.L.H. 809, 821-822J; City of
Tuscaloosa v. Pair, 282 Ala. 129 [167 So. 276, 27H]; Oulf,
JJfobilc d'; Ohio R. Co. v. Arthur Di:r:on
Co., ;348 Ill.
App. 148
N.E.2d
; 19 MtQnillin, Municipal
Corporations [1950], § 54.19, pp. 91-94; Prosser on Torts
, p. 1116; 1 Freeman on Judgments [5th er1. j, § 477,
p. fJ80.) " ( 41 Cal.2d 41fJ, 480.)
In 1.Yas71
Gaslight Co. v. District
161
l'.S. :n6, 32:5, 827, 328 [16 S.Ct. 564, 40 L.Ed. 712], the distriet had
the gas company permic;sion, for whieh it was
paid a dollar, to open the sidewalk to install a gas box which
loontained a cock in the service pipe. 'l'he box had an iron eover
wllich when loeked in place was :flush with the surfaee of the
sidewalk. After the installation of the box, the distrid ransed
the sidewalk to be widened so that the box was approximately
in the eenter thereof. 'l'he gas box was left open by the eompany and a pedestrian fell as a result thereof and was injured. She brought suit against the district and recovered
a judgment for surh damages. The distriet thereafter brought
an aetion for indemnity against the gas eompany to recover
the damage's it had been foreed to pay. 'l'he Supreme Court
of the United States, in affirming a ;judgment for the plaintiff
district against the gas company, held: "It won1l1 1w unreasonable to infer that Congress, when it authorizct1 the use
of the streets or sidewalks for the purposes of the (;as Company's business, contemplated that the c:ity of \Vashington
or its successor, the Distriet of Columbia, ~honld keep in
repair such apparatus, the continued location of which iu the
sidewalks of the eity was permitted, not only as an ineirlent
to the right to make and sell gas, but also for the pecuniary
benefit of the Gas Company. We eondude, therrfore, that the
duty was imposed upon the Gas Company to supervise and
keep the gas box iu repair. 'l'his duty not only doe:'> not eon:flid with the charter of the eompany, but on the eontrary is
sanetioned by its tenor·, and is imposed as :.tn ineviiahlP aetessory of the powers which the eharter (•onfe1·s . . . .
"Second. Iia<Z the District a cause
aefion auainst the
Gas Compa.ny resulting from the fact that ·it ll<ul been condemned to pay damages occasioned by the
gas box,

which 1't was the du.ty of the Gas Company to supervise and
repair·?
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answer to this proposition is rendered
and
This eourt said
Y.
Blark (U.S.], 418, 422 [17 hEd.
: 'li is well settled that a munieipal e.orporation having
the exel usive <·are and control of the streets, is obliged to see
that
arc kept safe for the passage of persolls and propand to abate all nuisanees that might prove dangerous;
and if this plain duty is neglected. and any one is
it
is liable for the damages sustained. The corporation has,
however, a remedy oyer against the party that is in fault, and
has so used the streets as to produce the injury, unless it was
also a \Hongdocr.' And the same doctrine is reiterated in
almost the ideuticallauguage in Robbins v. Chicago, 4 \Vall.
.s.J 6::>7, 670 r18 hEd. 427].
''The prinei ple thus announeed qualifies and restrains
within just limits the rigor of the rule whi<'h forbids recourse
between wrongdoers. In the leadiJJg ease of LowelL v. Boston
& Lowell Railroad [40 1\las;;.] 23 Pid{. 24, 32 f34 Am.Dee.
33], tlJC dodrine was thus stated: 'Our law, lwwever, does
not iu eve1·.r c·asc <1isallow an adion, b,\· one 1vrongdoer against
another, to recover damages ineurred in consequence of their
joint offense. 'l'he rule is, in pari delicto potior est conditio
clefenclentis. If the parties are not equally criminal, the
principal delinquent may be held responsible to his eo-delinquent for damages incurred by their joint offence. In respect
to offeuces, in whieh is involved any moral delinquency or
turpitude, all parties are deemed equally guilty, and eourts
will not inquire into their relative guilt. But where the offenc-e if' merely malwn prohibitum, and is in no respect immoral, it is not against the poliey of the law to inquire into
the relative delinquemy of the parties, and to administer
justice between them, although both parties are wrongdoers.' ''
(161 e.S., pp. 325, 327, 328.) In the "Statement of the
Case" (pp. 318, 319) it was noted that it was the district's
duty to inspeet, at the first of each month, the various gas
boxes in the sidewalks.
Cases from other jurisdictions also drav; a distinction between "aetiYe" and "passive" negligenee in holding that
the municipality is entitled to indemnity from the landowner
using the public ways for his own personal benefit and thereby
causing injury to a member of the public entitled to use the
sidewalk or street in the customary way. (City of Spokane v.
Crane Co., 98 Wash. 49 [167 P. 63, 64]; Salt Lake City v.
Schubach, 108 Utah 266 [159 P.2d 149, 155] .)

134
'['he following' qnoiat ions demr!n:,ll'ilk 1he
!nation ;,w·h a:.; we llav1: i11 1liP •·He:<'
ol' other
id.it>ns generally a,:n':' tlwi t
or sh011ld
a 1·ight of al'tiOil onT ng·ni
owner 1rhosc negligent use of the
i" wayc; has vam;ed it
to Leeome liable in
to a m<'lll hrr oft he
w.
ln lfl M1·Quillin, Mnnieipnl
tion G~.J!I, pages Dl-fl~, it iR
mnnil'ipality to reeover ove1·
nst the party J
for the
has heen rstablished so
now questioned,' the leading authority in support of' th rn1o
being a de1·isioH of the United States
1d1ieh
haR been approYed or followed in munerons ea:,es." In 4
Dillon. l\i[un ieipal Corpo1·ations, fd't h
page 3082, it is sai<l : "If a 111 nn
liable for damages sustained in eollsc•qlH'lH'P of 1lw unsafe
eondition of the sidewalks or
-it lias a
over
against lhc person
1chose wronuful act or conduct the sidewalk or street was Tendered
unkss thr rorporation was
itself a wt·ong-doel', as behYcen itself and the author of the
nuisanec• . . . . " A11d in Prosser on 'rorts, scc:ond edi lion,
page 2GO, it i:;; noted that "Again, it is quite getwrally agreed
that there may be indemnity in favor of: one who was U!Hler
only a c;ec·ondary duty where another \\·as
responsible, as where a municipal corporation, held liable for failure
to keep its streets in safe condition, seeks reeoyery from the
person IYho created the eondition or a property mvner who
permitted it.''
In Monsch Y. l'cllissia, 187 Cal. 790, 792,
7~JJ [204
P. 224], where plaintiff '\Yas injnrec1 be:"anse of the dci'ective
condition of a light-well in the sidewalk in front of defendaut's property, the eourt said: ''
as the
light-1vells, as suel!, -were, as we haYe seen, eonstrueteil for
the lwndit of' defendant and her property and for a n:;e indepcndellt of and apart from the ordinary and aeeustomed use
ol' the sidewalk, the law c·asts upon het the duty, to be disehargrd \Yith reasonable l'ill'l', of keeping it iu proper and
safe condition . . . .
''] n other words, undrr the facts of this ease, thr du i y was,
in tl1c first 1:nstance, itldcpendent of uotice to or
the eity,
cast npon the defendant to repair the gratings." (FJmpha,,is
added.) (See also Sc:rton v. Brool:s, 89 Cal.2d ];)8, 1G7 [24G
P.2d 496]; Granucci v. Claascn, 204 Cal. 509 [269 P. 437,
59 A.IJ.R. 485] .)
thai in
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also contends that the municipality's right of
aetion over
the landowner in such a situation should
be allowed in the interests of equity and justice; that it is
inequitable to hold the taxpayers liable for the negligent
maintenance of a structure in the public sidewalk which inures
to tlw lnndowncr 's private benefit.
'l'lw
also argues tl1at to hold the city liable in damages
for sueh 1andowner's negligence constitutes a gift of public
fnnds in violation of article IV, section 31, of the Constitution of California whi<:h provides, in part, that "The Legislature shan have no power to give or to lend . . . the credit
of . . . any . . .
and county . . . in aid of or to any
person . . . or to pledge the credit thereof, in any manner
whatever, for the payment of the liabilities of any individual. . . . "
As a final argument the city contends that in the enactment
of section 873 of the Code of Civil Procedure whieh became
effeetivc on January 1, 1958, the Legislature expressly recognized that there is a distinction in California between the
right to indemnity and the right to contribution. Section 875,
whieh provides for contribution between joint tortfcasors,
sets forth in subdivision (f) that '"l'his title shall not impair
any right of indemnity undee existing law, and where one
tortfeasor ;judgment debtor is entitled to indemnity from another there shall be no right of contribution between them."
THE DEFENDAKTS' ARGUMENT

Del'cndants eoutencl that the Peters ease laid down the rule
that the
and the landowner are each liable for their separate w1·ongfnl acts; that they are joint and concurrent tort
feasorFJ; that there is no
to contribution among joint
tortfeasors in California.'~
Drfendants rely on Smith v. Fall River J. U. High School
Dist., 1 Cal.2d 331, 334, 3:35 [34 P.2d 994]. In the Smith
ease, plaintiff was injured as the result of a collision between
a school bus owned and operated by one Fitzwater in which
r-;he 1n1s a pass\'llg'rr and an automobile driYen by one Peatt.
FilzY>ater had an agTE'ement with the school district whereby
it paid l1im so mneh per month to transport pupils, living
withiH the rli">trid, hy lms to sebool. Plaintiff sued the school
(tistrid, Fitz1·,'at\•r, the (lriY(T of the bns, and Pratt, on ac*As heretofore not0d, thiH rule was ebangcd
the Legislature in 19G7
by the ndditi'lll of section 87.> of tllc Code of
Proc0dure, effective
.January 1, Hl:)8. 'l'hc present ac-tion arose in 19.32.
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eount of their eoneurring negligence as the cause of her
lilJUries. She reeovered judgment against all three defendants. All three defendants appealed, but only the district and
Fitzwater gave a bond on appeal to stay exeeution. The
Independenee Indemnity Company was the surety on the
hond. The judgment was affirmed and the Independent Inpaid plaintiff the f:ull amount of tl1e judgment. The satisfaction of judgment executed
the plaintiff wat> not filrd until Pratt movrd the court to eompd its
entry. The motion was granted by the trial eonrt and the
indemnity cornpany appealed. At the time of thr hearing of
the motion, it appeared that prior to the accident Independence ludenmity Company had contracted in writing with the
school district to insure it aud Fitzwater against any such
loss occasioned by the use of the school bns. 'l'he indemnity
company eontended that it was entitled to be suhrogatecl to the
rights of the plaintiff against all three defendants because of
the stay bond given by it. The court held that if the '' appellant's sole liability to the parties herein was that incurred
under said stay bonrl, its position is undoubtedly correet." It
was held that "As appellant cannot recover from either the
dish·iet or Pitzwatcr by reason of its indemnity bond, can it
reeover against the rrspondent rPratt] whose negligence concurred \Vith that of Fitzwater in causing plaintiff's injuries 1
It is well settlrcl in this state that there is no n·ght of contribution between joint lort-feasors whose concurrent negligence has made them .iointly liable in damages. (Admns v.
White B1ts Line, 184 Cal. 710 [195 P. 389] .) 'fherefore, had
either of the two defendants, the srhool distriet or Fitzwater,
paid said judgment, no claim for contribution against the respondrnt could have bern made by the defendant making said
payment. Neither could the appellant, after paying the judgment as the indemnitor of the two defendants, the sehool
distriet and Piizl\·ater, c-ompel contribution or recoYrr an~T
thing from the respondent, a joint tort-feasor with the other
two defendants. This was the point involved and definitely
settled in the casP of Adams v. White Bns Line. SU[Wa."
(Emphasis added.) 'fhe eourt went on to hold that had the
indemnity company had only the stay or appeal bond aud
had there been no indemnity insurance the holding in La
li'lettr v. M.A. Burns Lmnber Co., 188 CaL 321 [205 P. 102],
"WOuld have applied. In the l..Ja Fleur case the surrty upon
tho appeal or stay bond paid the judgment and wa;;; held entitled under section 709 of the Code of Civil Procedure to be

-
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to all the rights of the plaintiff in the action in
which its pr.incipal had been defendant.
Defendants rely on Dow v. Snnset Tel. & :Tel.
188, 139 [121 P. 879], in support of their
that
the California courts do not draw a distinction brtween
"passive" and "active" negligence. In the Dow case plaintiff was the employee of the Sunset Telephone and 'f0legt'aph
Company. The facts showed that the telephone company had
Ol'iginall.v strung its wire too close to wires of the Oakland
Gas, I.1ight and Heat Company. The wires of the Oakland
light company were improperly insulated and the rontact betiveen the installations of the two companies produced a dangerous supercharge of electricity. An employee of the Oakland company reported the danger to his superior but it took
no steps either to eorrect the trouble or to warn tlw tc1cphont>
company. Plaintiff was assured by his superior in the telephone company that the wire was not supercharged with
electric-ity and while making an investigation of' some trouble
·with the telephone wire was seriously injured as a r0suJt of an
electric shock received from one of the telephone wires. He
brought an action against both cornpaniE>s and recovered a
judgment which was affirmed on appeal (Dow v. Sunset
Tel. & :Tel. Co., 157 Cal. 182 [106 P. 587]). Plaintiff collected the entire judgment from the Oakland Gas, I-"ight and
Heat Company and thereafter it sought eontribution from
the telephone eompany. ThE> court held: "Both companies
were liable, but appellant insists that it was only passively
guilty of a tort and that therefore it comes within an exception to the general rule above stated. With this view we
eannot agrre. It was the separate duty of each to take thorough precautions. Any aeeident due to neglect of snf'h duty
made the corporations jointly liable." The conrt in the
Dow case cites Forsythe v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 14~) CaL 569,
573 [87 P. 24], and Fowdcn v. Pacific Coast Steamship Co.,
149 Cal. 151, 157 [86 P. 178], in support of its statPment that
there is no contribution between joint tort feasors. In all
three of these eases contribution was sought by one joint tort
feasor against the other. It is eonced0d that the rule in California has always been that there ean be no enforerd eontribution between joint tort feasors. In the ease at bar, however, the city seeks indemnity from <1efE'ndants because of the
speeial licensor-licensee relationship existing between them
with respect to the use of the public ways.
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Defendant
Cod••. § il~-lOGO, G:Wfl 1) "evideneed a s1 ron;,?: pnl1l i(•.
poli<·y in f'ayor of plaeing fimm,·ial responsihilit.v 011 a
!'or failure to keep its pu hlie ways in safe eondi t ion"; that
if' the (•ity j,, entitled to indemnity from tlw property owner
it will exonerate thr city from all responsibility for ih; own
m•gled. [3b] \Ye held iH the Peters ease
Cal.2<l 410,
429) that tl1e city was direetly liable to
for failing to eorrcd a dangerous condition of whieh it ha(l notiee
and "it is not rdiewd of its responsibility in this regard
merely lw(:ause the condition was ercatc(l or maintained by a
property OWllPr \YhO might also rH' liable to pedestrian;:; for
illjuriPs resulting therefrom." [5b]
We also held that
"Even if such a right to contribution or indrmnity wPre
recognized, howrvrr, it would not mean, as asserted by the
c·ity, that its liability to pedestrians is merely dependent or
derivative from that of the landowner and not joint or
direct." (Pp. 430, 431.)
[7] We eonelnde that where an adjoining property owner
for the exclusive benrftt of his own property places in a
publie street or sidewalk some artificial strueture and a city
is compelled to p:l.~' eompem:at;_,,n in (1mnage:; to a membrr of
the public injured thereby the city has a right to recover the
amount so paid from the property owner by way of indemnity.
In so holding, we do not depart from our holr1ing in the
Peters case quoted just above. '\Ve affirm our statement there
that in holding that the eity has a right over against the
property owner we clo not mean that the city's liability to
the injured member of the public is merely dependent or derivative ancl not joint or direct.
The judgment is reversed.
(On\'.

Gibson, C.•J., Shenk, ,J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., eoncnrred.
SCIIAUEH, .J., Dissenting.-~It is my view that inasmuch
as the eity >Yas held liable to the injured pedestrian, Mrs.
\Vaguer, beeause of its own failure to perform obligations
owed direetly to her, no re(·oyery over ;;honld be permitted in
the eity ':-; favor as against t!w abutting property owner. This
eondnsion is emphasized hy the further faet that ::\Irs. \Vaguer
would 11ot lun·e sustained her injury if the eily had not
negleeted to per.form tlw duty it owed to her. As hereinafter
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shown the majority
creates a new right and enforces
it retroactively.
By adoption of the Public Liability .Act in 1923 (now Gov.
Cod0, § 53051) the Legislatnre imposed upon municipalities
liability to persons inj nred from the dangerous or defective
condition of si reets and sidewalks "if the legislative body,
board, or person authorized to remedy the condition: (a) Had
knowledge or notice of the defective or dangerous condition.
(b) For a reasonable time after acquiring knowledge oe
rcet'tvmg
fail0d to remedy the condition . . " (Gov.
Code, § 5::!051; see also Facl-~1·cll v. City of Son Dieao (1945),
26 Cal.2d J
203, 208 [9] f1:J7 P.2d 625, 158 A.L.H. 773];
Ackers v. City of Los Anwlcs (1940), 40 Cal..App.2cl 50, 53
[104 P.2d 399]; Jones v. City of Sou.th San Francisco (1950),
96 Cal.App.2d 427, 430-43:3 [216 P .2d 25].) 'l'he Streets
and Highways Code provides in section 5610 that "The owners of lots . . fronting on any portion of a public street ...
when that street . . . is improved . . . , shall maintain any
sidewalk in such condition that the sidewalk will not endanger
persons . . . " The same eod.e in section 5611 directs that
"\Vhen any portion of the sidewalk is out of repair . . .
and in condition to endanger persons ... in the use of such
sidewalk, the superintendent of streets shaH notify the owner
or person in possession of the property fronting on that
portion of snell sidewalk so out of: repair, to repair the sidewalk,'' and ( § 5615) ''If the repair is not commenced and
prosecuted "to completion with due diligence, as required by
the notice, the superintendent of streets shall forthwith repair
the sidewalk." (See also, S r.rton v. Brooks (Hl52), 89 Cal.
2d 153, 157-158 [245 P.2d 49G]; Laurenzi v. Vranizan (1945),
25 Cal.2d 806, 809-812 [155 P.2d 633]; Schaefer v. Lenahan
(1944), 63 Cal.App.2d 324, 326-327 [146 P.2d 929]; Barton
v. Capitol Market (1943), 57 Cal.App.2d 516, 517-518 [1]
[134 P.2d 847].) It follows that by the judgment ent(•red
in favor of the pedestrian, Mrs. \Vaguer, and against the
city it became established as a matter of law that the city
had knowledge or notice o£ the dangerous and defective sidewalk condition and permitted such condition to continue to
exist beyond a reasonable time and until she was injured
thereh.>··
Arellano v. City of Burbank (1939), 13 CaL
2cl 248. 254 [11 [89 P.2d 113].)
'rhis- eourt I{as spoeifioa1ly dcclarod that ''The duty of
the landowner is to nse due care not to ereatc or maintain
a dangerous eondition for the benefit of his property, while
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that of the
is to use due care to discover and remove
defeetive conditions. [Citations.] Thus, the liability of ead1
type of defendant is based upon his individual wrongful act
or
and it is possible to havr~ a valid verdid, exonerating one and holding the other. [Citations.] . . . " (Peters
v.
d':
San Prancisco (1953), 41 Cal.2d 419,
428-429
[260 P.2d 55].
In the Peters case the city argued that the judgment against
it should be reversed because there was no judgment against
the landowner, but we there stated that "\Ve do not agrPe.
The eity is nuder a duty to keep sidewalks in safe condition,
it is directly liable to pedestrians for failing to correct a
condition of which it had llOti(•e, alHl it is not
relieved of its responsibility in this regard merely beeause
the eondition was ereated or maintained by a property owner
who might also he liable to pedestrians for injuries resulting
therefrom. [Citations.] With regard to persons who are
injured by such a condition, the city and the landowner are
joint or concurrent tort feasors; each is direetly liable for
his own wrong and each may he held liable for the entire
damage suffered. [Citations.]" (Pete~·s v. City & County of
San Prancisco (1953), supra, 41 Cal.2d 419, 429 [14, 15,
16] ; see also, Dottglass v. City of Los Angeles (1935), 5 Cal.
2d 128, 128 [2] [53 P.2d 353]; Bosq1ri v. City of San Bcnwrdino (1935), 2 Ca1.2d 747, 764 [9] [43 P.2d 547]; Marsh v.
City of Sacramento (1954), 127 Cal.App.2d 721, 723-725 [1]
[274 P.2d 434]; Wilkes v. City &; Cottniy of San Francisco
(1041), 44 Cal.App.2d 393, 397 [5] [112 P.2d 759]; "~fulda
v. City
Los Angeles (1930), 110 Cal.App. 663, 668 [294
P. 485].) Thus, it is not for any aet or neglect of the property owner that the city is liable; it is liable, if at all, not on
and sueh theory as that of respondeat superior, but rathe1·,
solely for the breaeh of its own duty. And, perhaps more
important, it must be recognized that the acts of both on"ginal
defendants (the property owners and the city) were necessary
to produce the injury to the pedestrian, Mrs. ·wagner. If
either the property owner or the city had discharged the duty
respectively imposed on them the accident would not have
happened.
Under these eireumstanees it appears to me that to re•1uire
tlw landowner not merely to answer for his own ncgligeuc~e
but also to indemnify the eity for its independent tort will
tend to defeat the Legislature's purpose in making the city
liable for its own ncgllgenee in failing to vigilantly inspect
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Jnaintain, or require owners of ahutt
prop~
sidewalks iJJ a safe condition. H such a
err:atrd and enforced by this court, a most natural result
will he ('neouragement of laxity on the part oE the
out its obligation of inspection,
of
cwd proper maiutenance of sidewalks for the
of the pubLic. 'l'he proposal of' the city that
should be in~
denmified by the property owner for what it terms its own
"
" negligence in permitting a dangerous condition to
eontinue should be promptly and positiYely rejc·ete(l.
This matter obviously presents no such ease as San Francisco Unijiecl Sch. Dist. v. California Blclr;. etc. Co. ( 1H58),
162 Cal.App.2d 434, 443 I5J [328 P.2d 785], ,,·herein the
eourt expressly reeognized the rule that there is no right
of eoutribution among joint tort feasors but properly held
that in the cireumstauces of that case the rule was inappli<:able
because of the contractual relations of the parties. ''The con~
tract . . . provided that the [defendant] . . . 'is held responsible for payment of any cmd aU clarnages' resultinu from
'tts operations. l Italics added.] Even if this did not amount
to an express contract to indemnify the school disiriet for
damages caused to it by a breach of the contract by the
[defendant] . . . , such a warranty or agreement to indemnify
would necessarily be in:1plied. Whether the school district
[plaintiff] should be precluded from recovery by reason of
its conduct, that is, whether the conduct of the distriet helped
to bring about tlte damage, is at least a question of fact and
should have been left to the jury. Under suc:h cin·um"tanees
it was error to grant a nonsuit." (Pp. 448~44D of 162 CaL
App.2d.)
The case before us not only does not show any agreement
by the property owners to indemnify the city for the breach
of its duty but makes clear, as a matter of law, the fact that
"the conduct of the [city] helped to bring a bout tlJ e damage."
The case at bar, therefore, is fundamentally indistinguishable
from, and should be goyerned by, Dow v. Sunset Tel. & Tel.
Co. (1912), 162 Cal. 136, 138-140 [121 P. 379], and cases
there cited. (See also 23 So.Cal.L.Rev. 413.) In this case, as
in Dow, the independent negligence of both tort feasors was
necessar·y to cause the pedestrian's injury. From the faet
that the judgment in the basic personal injury action was
entered in favor of the plaintiff therein and has become final
as against both the city and the property owners, it follows
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matter of Jaw (
ildYPl'S() to
the
clefendauts in such busi1~ adiou I thai i he sub~
jed injury would not haYe O\:enrred i[ ei!lwe (a) the p1·operi,\'
O\Yll('l' had llOt <:J'eated the eondition or (b) tile ,•ily lm<l not
permitted the eoudition to eoutinue aftee it had 1Joti1·e and
\Yas bouwl to corn:d it. Thus the right of' tlw
to claim
ill(1emni:fieation for the eouseqnenres
hom its own
tort is a new right of reeoyery, not heretofore known to the
law of this state, and it is enforced retroadively
the same
decision which creat\'S it. Snc:h ruling:; should not find favor
with the c:ourt.
I ·would affirm the judgment denying reeowry to the (·ity.

HN H

Mc-Comb, ,J., concurred.
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'rHE PEOP11E, Hespondent, v. LUTIIBR POINDEXTER,
Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law-Appeal-Questions of Law and Pact-Reasonable Doubt.-The test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact,
not wlwther guilt is cstablisheu bcyonu a rPasonnble doubt.
[2] Poisons-Offenses-Furnishing Narcotics to Minor-Appeal."\ convietion of furnishing narcotics to a minor (Health & Saf.
Code, ~ 1l/14) y;ill not he disturbed on appeal, though there
was coniiicting testimony as to who supplied the narcotic~,
whet·e the jury chose to belieYe the minor's version of the
Ltds, iu1plicating defendant.
[3] Id.-Oi1enses-Furnlshing Narcotics to Minor-Indictment.An indictment for furnishing narcotics to a minor is not
fatally <kfectivc for failure to include the minor's name.

[4] !d.-Offenses-Furnishing Narcotics to Minor-Indictment.\VhPre defendant was indicteu for furnishing narcotics to a
minot', though there were two minors (one since deceased)
in\"oln•d, the fact that the prosecuting attorney stated in his
opening and closing arguments that the indictment related
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